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 1  Introduction  
 
"Death is the constant shadow that haunts the ex-mine workers as they struggle for 
compensation."
1 Linked to this are the poor working conditions that  South African 
miners find themselves in.
2 This is evident from the statistics of workers who die in 
accidents underground, while thousands more die of work-related diseases such as 
silicosis,
3 which is a debilitating disease that causes scarring and shrinking of the 
lungs,  destroying  the  breathing  ability  of  people  who  suffer from  it.
4  Excessive 
exposure to dust  and  asbestos  results  in asbestosis and  silicosis,  which  remain 
major causes of premature retirement and death among South African miners.
5 
 
Against this background, safety and health at work lie at the heart of the system of 
social security. The occupational health and safety system plays a crucial role in 
protecting employees against occupational injuries and diseases in their workplace. 
In fact, the occupational health and safety system has far -reaching implications for 
the contract of employment  as well as  in the lives of individuals, their families and 
communities. Recently, a number of scholars have addressed the impact of silicosis 
and asbestosis on the lives of mineworkers in South Africa.
6 
 
                                                 
*   Clarence  Tshoose.  LLB,  LLM  (North-West  University).  Senior  Lecturer  in  Mercantile  Law, 
College of Law, University of South Africa. E-Mail:tshooci@unisa.ac.za. The author would like to 
thank Ella Belcher (Chris Kapp Associates) and Jackie Viljoen for their editorial assistance in 
preparing this contribution. 
1   York 2011 www.republicofmining.com. 
2   SIMRAC 2003 researchspace.csir.co.za 24. 
3   SIMRAC 2003 researchspace.csir.co.za 24. 
4   Anonymous Date Unknonw jxzy.smu.edu.cn. 
5   SIMRAC 2003 researchspace.csir.co.za 24. 
6   McCulloch 2009 African Affairs 238-240; Ehrlich "Body as history"; Meeran 2003 IJOEH 218-227; 
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The  purpose of  this case  note  is to  analyse  critically  the  judgment  of  Mankayi v 
AngloGold Ashanti,
7 and to consider its implications for the system of occupational 
health and safety in South Africa. In this analysis, the main question is whether or 
not section 35(1) of COIDA,
8 which excluded Mankayi from its scope of application, 
is constitutional. The contribution will analyse the decision of the Constitutional Court 
which dealt with the interpretation of section 100(2) of the ODIMWA
9 and section 
35(1) of COIDA.
10 
 
As a precursor, it is important to provide an overview  of the Mankayi case for the 
discussion that follows. This will be done by analysing important legislation which 
plays  a  key  role  in  occupational  health  and  safety.  Secondly,  the  case  note  will 
examine  the  system  of  compensation  under  the  occupational  health  and  safety 
legislation.  Thirdly,  the  case  note  will  be  preceded  by  a  short  discussion  of 
jurisdiction and prescription. Thereafter a discussion of the Mankayi case follows. As 
a point of departure, it will be argued that the decision of the Constitutional Court has 
far-reaching  implications  for  the  future  of  occupational  health  and  safety,  and  in 
particular for the employer's liability for occupational injuries and diseases in mines. 
2  Brief overview of the Mankayi case 
The Constitutional Court in Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti
11 pondered the issue of the 
mineworkers' right to compensation. Firstly, the Court had to consider the provisions 
of section 100(2) of ODIMWA, which excluded Mankayi from claiming benefits under 
COIDA. Secondly, the Court had to decide whether section 35(1) of COIDA
12 limits 
the right of mineworkers to recover damages for occupational injury  sustained or 
disease contracted during the course of employment. 
 
                                                 
7   Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti 2011 32 ILJ 545 (CC) (hereafter referred to as the Mankayi case). 
8   Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (as amended by Act 61 of 
1997). 
9   Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973 (hereafter referred to as ODIMWA). 
10   Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (hereafter referred to as 
COIDA). 
11   Mankayi case. 
12   Section 35(1) COIDA states that no action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an 
employee for the recovery of damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting 
in the disablement or death of such employee against such employee's employer, and no liability 
for compensation on the part of such employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in 
respect of such disablement or death. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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It  is  against  this  background  and  on  this  basis  (as  discussed  above)  that  the 
Applicant (Thembekile Mankayi) challenged the findings of both the South Gauteng 
High Court
13and the Supreme Court of Appeal
14 in which section 35(1) of  COIDA 
was  interpreted  as  extinguishing  the  mineworkers'  common-law  right  to  sue  the 
employer  for  occupational  injuries  sustained  and  diseases  contracted  during  the 
course  of  employment,  while  protecting  the  employer  against  claims  arising  from 
non-compliance with the common-law duties of the employer, such as the duty to 
provide a safe working environment.  
 
Judge Boshoff, in Van Deventer v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,
15 
summarised an employer's duty as follows: 
 
An  employer  owes  a  common  law  duty  to  a  workman  to  take  reasonable 
care  for  his  safety.  The  question  arises  in  each  particular  case  what 
reasonable care is required. This is a question of fact and depends upon 
the circumstances of each particular case. A master [employer] is in the first 
place under a duty to see that his servants [employees] do not suffer through 
his  personal  negligence,  such  as  failure  to  provide  a  safe  working 
environment and a failure to provide [a] proper and suitable plant, if he knows 
or ought to have known of such failure. 
 
The  MHSA  further  places  a  duty  on  an  employer  to  provide  a  safe  working 
environment, and this duty is subject to the concept "reasonably practicable", 
which is defined in the Act. 
 
In terms of the MHSA, the employer at a mine being worked at must ensure 
safety at the mine without risk to the health of employees and persons who 
may be affected by the activities at the mine. The MHSA also states that the 
appointment of a manager does not relieve the employer of any duty imposed 
on him by the MHSA or any other law. Furthermore, if no manager is appointed, the 
employer must himself perform the functions of the manager. 
 
                                                 
13   Mankayi  v  AngloGold  Ashanti  Ltd  Case  No.  06/22312,  South  Gauteng  High  Court, 
Johannesburg, 26 June 2008, unreported. 
14   Mankayi  v  AngloGold  Ashanti  Ltd  2010  5  SA  137  (SCA).  This  case  was  overruled  by  the 
Constitutional Court on appeal. 
15   Van Deventer v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1962 4 SA 28 (T). CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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2.1  The facts 
 
In  the  present  case,  the  Applicant  had  been  employed  as  an  underground 
mineworker by the Respondent (AngloGold Ashanti Limited) for 16 years from 1979 
to 1995. In his particulars of claim the Applicant alleged that during his employment 
the Respondent had negligently exposed him to harmful dusts and gases as a result 
of which he contracted diseases in the form of tuberculosis and chronic obstructive 
airways disease, which had rendered him unable to work as a mineworker or in any 
other occupation. 
 
After  being  certified  as  suffering  from  a  compensatable  disease,  the  Applicant 
received R16 320.00 from the Compensation Commissioner in terms of ODIMWA. In 
enforcing  his  common-law  right,  the  Applicant  issued  summons  against  the 
Respondent. He claimed damages in the sum of about R2.6 million. This comprised 
past and future loss of earnings of R738 147.14, future medical expenses of R1 374 
600.00 and general damages of R500 000.00 (which included pain and suffering). 
 
In the light of the above facts in the Mankayi case, both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the Applicant was barred by section 35(1) of the 
COIDA  from  instituting  a  delictual  claim  against  his  former  employer,  the 
Respondent. In fact, the Respondent raised a technical point, that the Applicant was 
barred  by  the  operation  of  section  35(1)  of  COIDA  from  instituting  a  claim  for 
damages against the Respondent. Section 35(1) of COIDA provides that: 
 
an employee or any other dependent of an employee is precluded from recovering 
any  damages  in  respect  of  any  occupational  injury  or  disease  resulting  in  the 
disablement or death of such employee from such employee's employer. Section 
35(1)  also  provides  that  no  liability  for  compensation  shall  arise  against  an 
employer, except under COIDA. 
 
In this case, the Respondent raised exception to the Applicant's claim, arguing that 
section  35(1)  of  COIDA  barred  the  Applicant  from  claiming  damages.  The 
Respondent's exception was upheld by the High Court. The Applicant appealed the 
judgment  of  the  High  Court  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal.  On  appeal,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  found  that  section  35(1)  of  COIDA  extinguished  all 
common-law claims for damages for any occupational injury or disease resulting in CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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the disablement or death of an employee and, consequently, that the Applicant's 
claim was excluded by s 35(1) (discussed above). In short, the Applicant's appeal 
was  unanimously  dismissed  by  the  SCA  bench.  As  a  result,  the  Applicant 
approached the Constitutional Court on the following basis.   Firstly, to determine 
whether  section  100(2)  of  ODIMWA  precludes  the  Applicant  from  claiming 
compensation under COIDA. It is important to note that section 100(2) provides that 
no  person  who  has  a  claim  to  benefits,  under  ODIMWA,  in  respect  of  a 
compensatable disease, as defined in ODIMWA, on the ground that such person is 
or was employed at a controlled mine, shall be entitled, in respect of such disease, to 
benefits under COIDA, or any other law. Secondly, the Constitutional Court had to 
determine  whether  section  35(1)  of  COIDA  includes  employees  covered  by 
ODIMWA, notwithstanding that they are barred from claiming benefits under COIDA; 
and the abrogation of the common-law right of action envisaged by section 35(1) of 
COIDA. 
 
2.2  The decision of the Constitutional Court: Some preliminary remarks on 
prescription and jurisdiction 
 
2.2.1  Prescription 
 
In the Mankayi case the Court was silent on the Prescription Act.
16 However, it is 
important to give a brief overview of some of the relevant provisions of the Act 
which have some relevance to this case. The Prescription Act has the effect of 
extinguishing a debt after the lapse of a specified period. A debt in the context 
under discussion refers to the Applicant's claim for damages. The relevant period 
in  this  regard  is  three  years.
17  The question  often arises when prescription 
commences. Must a plaintiff know all the facts on which his/her claim is based 
before prescription commences? Section 12 of the Prescription Act provides that 
prescription shall commence to run "as soon as the debt is due".
18 However, if 
the defendant (a debtor) wilfully prevents the plaintiff (a creditor) from coming to 
know of the existence of the debt (the claim), prescription shall not commence to 
                                                 
16   Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (hereafter referred to as the Prescription Act). 
17   Section 11 Prescription Act. 
18   Section 12(1) Prescription Act. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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run until the plaintiff becomes aware of the existence of the claim.
19 In Truter and 
Another v Deysel,
20 the court per Van Heerden, JA held inter alia as follows: 
 
For the purposes of the Act, the term "debt due" means a debt, including a delictual 
debt, which is owing and payable. A debt is due in this sense when the creditor 
acquires a complete cause of action for the recovery of the debt, i.e. when the 
entire set of facts which the creditor must prove in order to succeed with his or her 
claim  against  the  debtor  is  in  place  or,  in  other  words,  when  everything  has 
happened which would entitle the creditor to institute action and to pursue his or her 
claim. 
 
Even though the Constitutional Court was silent on the issue of prescription, it is 
clear that the Mankayi case falls within the statutory confines of the Prescription 
Act, because the Applicant in his particulars of claim alleged that in 1993 and in 
1999 he was diagnosed  as suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis and that in 
August 2006 he was informed that he had contracted silicosis and obstructive 
airways  disease.  In  my  opinion,  the  discussion  on  the  Prescription  Act  gives 
some guidelines on the time frames required by our law for a party to institute a 
claim against an employer. 
 
2.2.2  Jurisdiction  
 
The  Constitutional  Court  was  called  upon  to  decide  if  it  had  jurisdiction  to 
entertain this matter. In analysing the question of jurisdiction, the Court remarked 
that in a system of constitutional supremacy it is inappropriate to construe the 
concept of what is a "constitutional matter" narrowly. According to the Court, a 
constitutional matter involves the following:
21 
 
(a)  the  interpretation,  application  or  upholding  of  the  Constitution  itself,  (b)  the 
development of (or the failure to develop) the common law in accordance with the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, (c) a statute that conflicts with a 
requirement or restriction imposed by the Constitution, (d) the interpretation of a 
statute in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights (or the 
failure to do so), (e) the erroneous interpretation or application of legislation that has 
been  enacted  to  give  effect  to  a  constitutional  right  or  in  compliance  with  the 
legislature's constitutional responsibilities, or (f) executive or administrative action 
that conflicts with a requirement or restriction imposed by the Constitution. 
                                                 
19   Section 12(2) Prescription Act. 
20   Truter v Deysel 2006 4 SA 168 (SCA). 
21   Mankayi case. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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In  addition,  as  Khampepe  J  remarked,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  justice  that  an 
authoritative  interpretation  be  given  to  a  statutory  provision  that is claimed  to 
curtail an employee's common-law right to recover compensation for the harm 
suffered  in  consequence  of  an  employer's  negligence.  This  is  so  where  the 
employee is not entitled to claim the benefits under that statute and can claim 
only  seemingly  paltry  benefits  under  a  different  statute.
22  Froneman  J,  in 
delivering her reasons for granting leave to appeal, argued that the mere fact that 
this case concerns the interpretation of a statute is sufficient to bring it within the 
Constitutional Court's jurisdiction.
23 Froneman states: 
 
This constitutional injunction makes it impossible to interpret any legislation other 
than through the prism of the Bill of Rights. Statutory interpretation is thus inevitably 
a constitutional matter. It is a legal issue which necessarily involves the evaluation 
of social and policy choices reflected in legislation. 
 
With reference to Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: 
In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,
24 the Court 
observed that there is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitutio n, 
which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its 
force  from  the  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  South  Africa,  1996  (the 
Constitution) and is subject to constitutional control. The Court further noted the 
decision in S v Boesak,
25 and Fraser v Absa Bank Ltd (National Director) Public 
Prosecutions  as  Amicus  Curiae,
26  and  held  that  there  are  non-exhaustive 
instances  of  what  constitute  constitutional  matters.  The  Constitutional  Court 
further  held  that  a  constitutional  matter  can  among  other  things  include  all 
questions of law which are derived from the Constitution.
27 
 
This approach to  interpretation adopted by t he Court suggests that  as far as 
constitutional  interpretation  is  concerned ,  South  Africa  is  undergoing  a 
                                                 
22   Mankayi case para 21. 
23   Mankayi case paras 117-118. 
24   Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44. 
25   S v Boesak 2001 1 SA 912 (CC) paras 10-5. 
26   Fraser v Absa Bank Ltd (National Director); Public Prosecutions as Amicus Curiae 2007 3 SA 
484 (CC) paras 35-47. 
27   Mankayi case para 125. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
 
240 / 261 
 
transformation from a formal, positivistic vision of law to a substantive, natural 
law vision of law. 
 
2.3  Analysis of and comment on the Mankayi case 
 
In the judgment delivered by Ngcobo CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Brand AJ, Cameron J, 
Froneman  J,  Mogoeng  J,  Nkabinde  J,  Skweyiya  J  and  Yacoob  J,  the 
Constitutional Court overturned the previous judgment of the Labour Court and 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  where  it  was  held  that  section  35  of  COIDA 
extinguishes  the  common-law  right  of  mineworkers  to  recover  damages  for 
occupational injury or disease from negligent mine owners under COIDA. The 
South Gauteng High Court (High Court)
28 and the Supreme Court of Appeal
29 
interpreted section 35(1) of  COIDA as extinguishing the mineworkers' common-
law  claim  and  extending  the  protection  against  common-law  liability  to  mine 
owners. 
 
The Constitutional Court held that section 35(1), while excluding the common-law 
right of employees to sue the employer for damages in respect of occupational 
injury or disease, covers only employees who are entitled to claim under COIDA. 
Mineworkers excluded in terms of ODIMWA from claiming against their employer 
under COIDA for compensatable diseases in a controlled mine are not covered 
by section 35(1). 
 
In  justifying  the  conclusion  it  reached,  the  Court  premised  its  argument  on 
section  39(2)  of  the  Constitution,  which  provides  that  a  court  must,  when 
interpreting any legislation, promote the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of 
Rights. The Court per Froneman J
30 reasoned that  the interpretation given to 
section 35(1) of the COIDA in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal has 
the  effect of abolishing  a  common-law  right  which  protected  and  provided  an 
appropriate  remedy  to  the  fundamental  right  to  freedom  and  security  of  the 
person  in  terms  of  section  12(1)  of  the  Constitution.  One  of  the  main  issues 
                                                 
28   Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Case No 06/22312, South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg, 
26 June 2008, unreported. 
29   Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2010 5 SA 137 (SCA). 
30   Mankayi case para 120. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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examined by the Court was the question of whether COIDA applies to employees 
covered  by  section  100(2)  of  ODIMWA,  and  whether  the  exclusionary  and 
extinguishing effect of section 35(1) applies only to employees who have a claim 
for compensation under COIDA in respect of the occupational disease suffered 
by Mankayi. The Constitutional Court remarked that the meaning of the word 
"employee" in section 1 of COIDA covers employees such as the Applicant, who 
are  entitled  to  claim  for  occupational  diseases  under  COIDA  and  who  may 
become entitled to claim benefits for compensatable diseases under ODIMWA.
31 
 
The Court also acknowledged that various provisions indicated that  COIDA also 
applies to employees in controlled mines and works. The definition of the words 
"employee"  and  "employer"  respectively  do  not  expressly  exclude  employees 
who could have a claim for compensation under ODIMWA. ODIMWA provides 
statutory  compensation  for  designated  compensatable  diseases  contracted  at 
controlled mines and works. 
 
Apart  from  providing  compensation  for  occupational  injuries,  COIDA  also 
provides for statutory compensation in respect of a number of listed occupational 
diseases
32  contracted by employees in the course of their employment and 
resulting in disablement or death. The diseases that constitute  "compensatable 
diseases" under ODIMWA overlap with the diseases that constitute occupational 
diseases under COIDA. In the case of the Applicant, the disease which he had 
contracted  could  fall  within  both  COIDA  and  ODIMWA,  but  section  100(2)  of 
ODIMWA precludes him from claiming under COIDA. For the disablement set out 
in his particulars of claim, he is restricted to his ODIMWA remedy and is not 
entitled to a COIDA claim. 
 
                                                 
31   Mankayi case para 72. 
32   Section 1 COIDA defines "occupational diseases" as any disease contemplated in s 65(1)(a) or 
(b). S 65(1)(a) refers to Schedule 3. Schedule 3 lists occupational diseases to include, inter alia, 
the following respiratory diseases: 
(i)  Pneumoconiosis-fibrosis of the parenchyma of the lung caused by fibrogenic dust; 
(ii) Pleural thickening caused by asbestos dust exposure; 
(iii) Silicotuberculosis; 
(iv)  Bronchopulmonary diseases caused by hard-metal dust; 
(v) Bronchopulmonary diseases caused by cotton, flax, hemp or sisal dusts (byssinosis);and 
(vi)  Chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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Furthermore, the Court also considered the impact of section 100(2) of ODIMWA 
on  the  definition  of  "employee"  and  the  use  of  that  word  in  section  35(1)  of 
COIDA which provides: 
 
… substitution of compensation for other legal remedies ... No action shall lie by an 
employee or any dependant of an employee for the recovery of damages in respect 
of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement or death of such 
employee against such employee's employer, and no liability for compensation on 
the part of such employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in respect 
of such disablement or death. 
 
What  is striking  in  this provision  is that  there  is no  reference at all  to  ODIMWA, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  COIDA  was  enacted  more  than  twenty  years  after 
ODIMWA.  Had  the  legislature  intended  for  ODIMWA  to  entitle  employees  to  be 
covered under COIDA, it would have been easy for it to have included references to 
ODIMWA, but it has not done so. 
 
It is, of course, important to be attentive to the precise language of the provision. 
What section 35(1) does in terms of the Court's interpretation is twofold. Firstly, it 
expunges the common-law claims of employees against the employer and, secondly, 
it  limits  an  employer's  liability  to  pay  compensation  save  for  under  the  Act.  It 
expressly states that no liability for compensation on the part of such an employer 
shall arise save under the provisions of this Act. 
 
It limits the employer's liability to pay compensation to liability under COIDA alone. 
That, in the Court's view, is an indication that both parts of the provision apply only to 
those employees covered by "the provisions of this Act"; namely, COIDA. Secondly, 
the Court emphasised that, if the language of section 35(1) is unclear, this Court 
would be entitled to have regard to the heading to determine its meaning. However, 
in the Court's view the language is clear, even without the heading. Section 35(1) 
substitutes COIDA compensation for other legal remedies and no more. Neither this 
provision  nor  any  other  in  the  relevant  statute  refers  to  compensation  under 
ODIMWA. 
 
According to the Court, the compensation provisions of ODIMWA and COIDA are 
separate but contiguous. While section 100(1) of ODIMWA precludes "double-CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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dipping"  on  the  part  of  employees  who  qualify  for  compensation  because  of 
having  contracted  a  disease  that  is  listed  under  both  ODIMWA  and  COIDA, 
section 100(2) of ODIMWA goes further and specifically precludes employees 
with claims in respect of compensatable diseases under ODIMWA from claiming 
any COIDA benefits in respect of the same disease. It is difficult to see how 
section 100(2), while removing employees from COIDA compensation, could at 
the  same  time  render  section  35(1)  applicable  to  them.  Thirdly,  the  court 
analysed the comparison between COIDA and ODIMWA (see discussion at 2.4.1 
below). 
 
The Constitutional Court's decision in the Mankayi case, in my opinion, has far-
reaching  consequences  for  employers,  and  also  in  the  area  of  occupational 
health and safety. The Constitutional Court in this case should be commended 
for adopting a far-reaching and innovative way of developing the common law 
(discussed  below).  The  Court's  approach  in  developing  the  common  law  is 
informed by section 39(2) of the Constitution, which empowers the Court, when 
interpreting any legislation and when developing common law or customary law, 
to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
 
This decision by the Constitutional Court imposes a duty on courts to ensure 
that, when faced with the task of developing common law, they do so in line with 
the Constitution.
33 The Court's decision moreover imposes a duty on the courts 
to  give  effect  to  the  tenets  of  the  Bill  of  Rights.  The  Court  developed  the 
common-law rule in this decision, which resulted in the Respondent b eing made 
liable for the damages  as a result of the exposure by the Applicant to harmful 
dusts and gases in consequence of which he contracted diseases in the form of 
tuberculosis and chronic obstructive airways disease, which have rendered him 
unable to work as a mineworker or in any other occupation. 
 
The importance of this decision is extensive . It will surely change the way in 
which the courts deal with cases relating to compliance with occupational health 
and safety laws. It also deals successfully wit h the right to  the  freedom and 
                                                 
33   Section 39(2) Constitution. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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security of a person as enshrined in the Constitution.
34 
 
In this regard the Court referred to the matter of Law Society of South Africa and 
Others v Minister for Transport and Another.
35 In this case, the Court held that 
the  abolition by  the  legislature  of  the  common-law  claim  to  sue  a  driver of  a 
motor  vehicle  for  negligent  injury  implicated  the  right  enshrined  in  section 
12(1)(c) and had to pass muster under the limitations provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.
36 Similarly, the  Court remarked that this same constitutional right finds 
expression in the legislation that seeks to regulate the safety of the mining 
industry,  the  Mine  Health  and  Safety  Act  29  of  1996  and  the  regulations 
prescribed thereunder. 
 
2.4  The  protection  of  mineworkers  against  occupational  injuries  and 
diseases in South Africa 
 
There are various sources which regulate occupational injuries and diseases. The 
International  Labour  Organisation  has  a  number  of  conventions  concerning 
employment  injuries  and  diseases.
37  In  South  Africa  a  constitutional  imperative 
regarding occupational health and safety exists.
38 Collective agreements can also 
contain  arrangements  relevant  to  social  security  and  heal th  and  safety  at  the 
workplace. 
 
The primary legislation in South Africa which provides for preventative measures are 
Occupational Health and Safety Act,
39 and the Mine Health and Safety Act,
40 while 
                                                 
34   Section 12 Constitution. 
35   Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC). 
36   Mankayi case paras 75-78. 
37   They  include  Convention  on  Minimum  Standards  of  Social  Security  102  of  1952,  and  the 
Convention on Benefits in the Case of Employment Injury 121 of 1964. 
38   Section 24 Constitution states that everyone has the right to a safe working environment that 
promotes personal health  and  well-being. To put this in perspective, employers must identify 
workplace hazards, assess the potential risks stemming from these hazards and take appropriate 
action, which includes informing employees of the safety measures and risks associated with 
their workplace. For a detailed discussion on the employer's common law duties see Tshoose 
2011 JICLT 166-171. 
39   Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 (hereafter referred to as OHSA). 
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the most important legislation that regulates compensation for employees' injuries 
and diseases (and even death) suffered and contracted at work is the COIDA.
41 
 
There  is  also  the  ODIMWA,
42  which  provides  for  mandatory  reporting  and  the 
payment of certain benefits to mineworkers who develop certain occupational lung 
diseases, as well as the payment of certain benefits for  the dependants of workers 
who die from such diseases. The  Road Accident Fund Act
43 is applicable where an 
employee is injured while being conveyed by a motor vehicle in the course of his 
employment. In cases of commuting injuries, COIDA and the RAF Act must be read 
together. For the purposes of this contribution, however, the discussion is confined to 
COIDA, OHSA, and ODIMWA. 
 
It is also important to note that the OHSA and the Mines Health and Safety Act are 
aimed at ensuring the health and safety of employees at the workplace. In essence, 
these statutes serve a truly preventative purpose in the sense that they strive to 
prevent the contraction of diseases or injuries by employees. Similarly, COIDA and 
ODIMWA  deal  with  the  aftermath  of  injury  or  disease,  i.e.  the  payment  of 
compensation to the injured employee. 
 
The purpose of workers' compensation legislation was pointed out by Price J in R v 
Canquan
44 when he remarked: 
 
[Such legislation] is designed to protect the interests of employees and to safeguard 
their rights, and its effect is to limit the common-law rights of the employers and to 
enlarge  the  common-law  rights  of  employees.  The  history  of  social  legislation 
discloses  that  for  a  considerable  number  of  years  there  has  been  progressive 
encroachment  on  the  rights  of  employers  in  the  interests  of  workmen  and  all 
employees. So much has this been the purpose of social legislation that employees 
have been prevented from contracting to their detriment. They have been prohibited 
from  consenting  to  accept  conditions  of  employment  which  the  legislature  has 
considered are too onerous and burdensome from their point of view. 
 
In addition, COIDA is wider in scope than the Workmen's Compensation Act, which it 
replaced in 1993. Compensation is payable only if the accident which caused the 
                                                 
41   COIDA. 
42   ODIMWA. 
43   Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the RAF Act). 
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injury, illness or death occurred within the scope of the employee's employment and 
was not predictable. No payments are made in respect of temporary disabilities of 
three days or less.
45 
 
It is common that in most social security systems , even where a completely unified 
scheme for disability exists, a separate and more favourable scheme for industrial 
injuries is often retained. Occupational injury and disease benefits are not simply 
granted or allocated; they are bought through insurance contributions . Employees 
make available their labour to the employer who benefits from it financially. It is 
therefore accepted that the responsibility of financing such an insurance scheme 
rests with employers. In return, a statutory provision, such as section 35 of  COIDA, 
replaces an employer's delictual liability towards the employee with insurance cover.  
 
2.4.1  Comparison between COIDA and ODIMWA on the levels of compensation  
 
The comparison between ODIMWA and COIDA compensation is aimed at proving 
that a person compensated under COIDA for an occupational disease is in a much 
better  position  than  another  person  suffering  from  the  same  disease  but  who  is 
compensated  under  ODIMWA.  The  Court,  before  coming  to  its  conclusion,  first 
compared the compensation payable under COIDA and ODIMWA respectively. 
 
In  terms  of  COIDA,  an  employee  who  suffers  from  an  occupational  disease  is 
entitled  to  compensation  in  terms  of  Chapter  VII  of  COIDA,  which  is  headed 
"Occupational diseases".
46 However, this Chapter does not exclusively concern itself 
with the mechanism for compensation, but sets out general principles. Section 65(6) 
of COIDA provides that the sections of COIDA regarding an accident apply "mutatis 
mutandis"  to  any  occupational  disease  in  relation  to  which  there  is  a  right  to 
compensation in terms of COIDA.
47 It is therefore necessary to revert to Chapter VI 
of COIDA, which is concerned with compensation for accidents. The court used the 
term  "occupational  disease"  as  used  in  Chapter  VII.  Employees  who  suffer  from 
occupational diseases are not compensated in respect of the disease itself but for 
                                                 
45   Grogan Workplace Law 9. 
46   Sections 65-70 COIDA. 
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temporary  total  disablement,  temporary  partial  disablement  and  permanent 
disablement. 
 
An employee who incurs temporary total disablement as from 1 April 2010
48 would 
be entitled to rece ive up to 75   percent of  his/her monthly earnings subject to a 
maximum of R16 400 and a minimum of R2 100 per month.
49 The employer must 
pay this amount for the first three months of disability after which the Fund or the 
mutual association concerned takes over.
50 The employee is entitled to 75 percent of 
his/her monthly earnings for a maximum period of 24 months,
51 but this period may 
be extended in certain circumstances.
52 This is particularly relevant to the ODIMWA 
comparison, which is made later, in that an employee who receives 75 percent  of 
his/her monthly earnings for 24 months will in effect receive a total of one-and–a-half 
times his/her annual earnings and will return to work after that. 
 
Employees who suffer permanent disability for the purposes of COIDA as a result of 
an occupational disease are in a much better position than the ones restricted to 
ODIMWA  compensation. They  are  compensated  according  to the  degree  of  their 
disability. The following examples, which were analysed by the court, demonstrate 
the gap between COIDA and ODIMWA in many respects: 
 
(a)  Employees who have a permanent disability of 30 percent are entitled 
to a lump sum of 15 times their monthly salary; that is to say, one-and-a 
quarter  times  their  annual  salary  subject,  as  at  1  April  2010,  to  a 
minimum lump sum of R45 800 and a maximum of R183 400.
53 By 
contrast,  the  Applicant,  who  was  diagnosed  as  suffering  from  a 
compensatable disease which rendered him completely unemployable, 
received a total of R16 320 under  ODIMWA  as  calculated  in  2005. 
Under COIDA he would have received R24 480 if he had been found to 
have been permanently disabled to a degree of 30 percent in 2005. 
                                                 
48   The maximum and minimum amounts claimable are changed from time to time, but other details 
remain the same. For example see GN 304 in GG 33118 of 21 April 2010. 
49   Section 47(1) and (2) COIDA read with item 1 of Schedule 4. 
50   Section 47(3)(b) COIDA. 
51   Section 47(5) COIDA. 
52   Section 48(2) COIDA. 
53   Item 2 of Schedule 4 COIDA. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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(b)  Employees who suffer a 100 percent permanent disability are entitled 
to a monthly pension of 75 percent of their monthly salaries subject, as 
at  1  April  2010,  to  a  minimum  monthly  pension  of  R2  300  and  a 
maximum  of  R16  400.
54  The  Applicant  would  have  received  a 
minimum monthly pension of R1  224 under  COIDA  from  2005  and 
would by now have received in excess of R70 000 if he had been found 
to have been permanently disabled in 2005. There is also a provision 
for the payment of a lump sum to this category of employee in certain 
circumstances.
55 
 
The dependant of an employee who dies as a result of an occupational disease 
would  essentially receive in effect a lump sum of twice the monthly pension (a 
minimum of R4 600 as at 1 April 2010).
56 The dependants would secondly benefit 
from a monthly pension of 40 percent of the amount that would have been payable to 
the employee had the employee been 100 percent permanently disabled.
57 Thirdly, 
the Director-General would have to pay the employee's funeral costs subject to a 
maximum of R12 300 as at 1 April 2010.
58 Moreover, if the employer was negligent, 
the employee would receive more mone y and could in fact be compensated for 
his/her total financial loss.
59  This concludes the overview of  COIDA  benefits  in 
respect of occupational diseases. 
 
The Court interpreted the relevant provisions of ODIMWA to the extent that it relates 
to  COIDA.  The  Court  emphasised  that  ODIMWA  becomes  applicable  when  an 
occupational disease is classified as a "compensatable disease". One would have 
expected the benefits under ODIMWA to be more or less the same or somewhat 
more than under COIDA, but the opposite is the case. Except for a person suffering 
from tuberculosis, who is entitled to 75 percent of his monthly earnings when ill,
60 the 
only benefits payable to a person who is suffering from a compensatable disease 
                                                 
54   Section 49(1) COIDA read with item 4 of Schedule 4. 
55   Section 52 COIDA. 
56   Section 54(1)(a) COIDA read with item 6 of Schedule 4. 
57   Section 54(1)(b) COIDA read with item 7 of Schedule 4. 
58   Section 54(2) COIDA read with item 10 of Schedule 4. 
59   Section 56(4)(b) COIDA. 
60   Section 80(1) ODIMWA. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
 
249 / 261 
 
contracted as a result of risk work is a lump sum which amounts to approximately 
one  and  one  third  of  his  annual  salary
61  if  that  employee  suffers  from  a 
compensatable disease in the first degree, and about three times his annual salary
62 
if the compensatable disease is in the second degree.
63 
 
There is no pro vision for  the  payment of funeral expenses, or any lump sum or 
pension  for  dependants.  The  statute  does ,  however,  make  provision  for   the 
dependants of a person who died of a compensatable disease  to receive the lump 
sum that would have been payable to that person had he not died.
64 In other words, 
where the person suffering from a compensatable disease has been paid the lump 
sum, the dependants get nothing even if they are children. To make matters worse, 
the person who finds himself afflicted with a compensatable disease merely because 
of legislative classification has no right to claim additional damages even if the 
employer  was  negligent,  a  right  that  is  reserved  for  employees  who  suffer 
occupational diseases. 
 
With this in mind, according to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
erred in concluding that it is not possible to compare the two provisions. This is 
despite the fact that the differences between the compensatory regimes of  COIDA 
and  ODIMWA  are  quite  apparent.  A  person  whose  disease  is  certified  as  a 
compensatable  disease  loses  all  the  benefits  of  COIDA  and  receives  much  less 
under ODIMWA.
65 The purpose is obviously to reduce the burden on the  COIDA 
fund  by  converting  an  occupational  disease  into  a  compensatable  disease.  This 
means that the person benefits to a considerably lesser degree from another fund to 
which the employer makes a contribution and a much smaller contribution at that, 
because of the smaller benefits payable. The saving to the employer arising out of 
the  redefinition  of  the  disease  amounts  to  a  reduction  in  the  contribution  to  the 
COIDA  fund,  which  exceeds  the  amounts  to  be  paid  to  facilitate  the  lesser 
compensation under ODIMWA. It must be emphasised that an employee who has a 
claim under ODIMWA has to be excluded from its scope of coverage. The drastic 
                                                 
61   Section 80(2)(a) ODIMWA, which provides for 1.31 of an annual salary. 
62   Section 80(2)(b)(i) ODIMWA, which provides for 2.917 of an annual salary. 
63   Section 80(2)(b)(i) ODIMWA. 
64   Section 80(4) ODIMWA. 
65   Mankayi case para 88. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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reduction  in  his  compensation  is  obligatory.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that 
ODIMWA is silent on the issue of common law liability.
66  
 
The Court also commented on the enhanced compensation for which section 56 of 
COIDA provides where an employee contracts an occupational disease due to the 
negligence  of  the  employer  or  other  specified  categories  of  related  persons. 
ODIMWA has no comparable provision.
67 This leaves those entitled only to ODIMWA 
compensation at a severe disadvantage. The argument that section 35(1) must be 
interpreted to exclude mineworkers' common-law claims so as to create a just and 
sensible parity in the two statutes' compensation systems is thus without merit. 
 
In its conclusion the Court held that section 35(1) must be read in the context of the 
other  provisions  of  COIDA.  The  employee  referred  to  in  section  35(1)  whose 
common-law  claim  is  expunged  is  limited  to  an  employee  who  has  a  claim  for 
compensation  under  COIDA  in  respect  of  occupational  diseases  mentioned  in 
COIDA. It is this employee that section 35(1) of COIDA excludes from instituting a 
claim for the recovery of damages against the employer for occupational diseases 
resulting in disablement or death. The expungement does not extend to an employee 
who  is  not  entitled  to  claim  compensation  in  respect  of  "occupational  diseases" 
under COIDA. 
 
The corollary is that section 35(1) does not cover an employee who qualifies for 
compensation  in  respect  of  "compensatable  diseases"  under  ODIMWA.  The 
exclusion  of  liability  in  section  35(1)  is  therefore  limited  to  employees  who  are 
entitled to compensation in respect of "occupational diseases" under COIDA. The 
exception raised by the Respondent should therefore have been dismissed. 
 
The consequence of the judgment is that only employees who are precluded from 
claiming under COIDA as a result of the wording of section 100 (2) may now institute 
a claim of damages against their employer. The employee will still have the onus of 
proving  damages  and  that  such  damages were  caused  by  the negligence  of  the 
employer. This judgment does not mean that all employees at all mines and works 
                                                 
66   Mankayi case para 88. 
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will always have a right to bring claims for damages against their employer in respect 
of illness suffered in the course and scope of their employment. The application of 
ODIMWA  is  limited  to  certain  compensatable  diseases  such  as  tuberculosis  and 
permanent obstruction of the airways. Progressive systematic sclerosis and all other 
permanent diseases of the cardio-respiratory organs are included under ODIMWA 
only  if  they  are  attributable  to  the  performance  of  risk  work  as  defined  under 
ODIMWA. The category of employees who fall within the ambit of section 100(2) is 
limited to those who claim under ODIMWA on the ground that they were employed at 
a controlled mine or a controlled works. In respect of tuberculosis ODIMWA deems 
risk work at any mine or works to be risk work performed at a controlled mine or 
works.  The  extent  to  which  employees  have  to  rely  on  the  fact  that  they  were 
employed at a controlled mine or works in order to be entitled to benefits is further 
not clear from the wording of ODIMWA. 
 
2.5  The significance of Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2011 32 545 (CC) 
 
The Constitutional Court's decision in the Mankayi case deemed to be relevant to the 
system of occupational health and safety based on the following reasons. Firstly, the 
Constitutional  Court  has  developed  a  precedent  to  determine  the  content  and 
meaning of the employer's duty of care. Phrased differently, there are yardsticks or 
standards of conduct against which the employer's conduct can be measured and 
judged. This judgment will instil some sense of accountability in employers who have 
exploited workers working under horrendous conditions for many years. Secondly, 
the  judgment  indicates  that  it  is  time  the  mines  are  taken  to  task  about  their 
responsibilities for the health and safety of employees in the workplaces. Lastly, the 
Mankayi  case  illustrates  the  difference  in  compensation  that  is  being  paid  to 
employees suffering from the same occupational diseases. In short, it can be argued 
that the Mankayi case is the Court's latest and most promising innovation in the area 
of occupational health and safety. 
 
In addition, in most civil-law jurisdictions the common-law duty of care is constantly 
being refined and given meaning and content by the courts through their judgments CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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(as  discussed  above).
68  In most countries the legislature has further refined the 
employer's duty of care by enacting health and safety legislation. In g eneral, health 
and safety legislation is intended to give specific content to the duty of care, and to 
enhance  accountability  by  providing  for  a  range  of  additional  criminal  and 
administrative sanctions. 
 
One of the criticisms levelled against this decision by the Constitutional Court is that 
this case will open the floodgates to many cases against the employers. However, in 
my opinion  this decision of the Constitutional Court has  the  potential  to  achieve 
legislative change, in particular with regard to the protection of miners and ex-miners 
against  occupational  injuries  and  diseases.  This  resonates  well  with  the 
constitutional provision which affords everyone the right to a healthy environment.
69 
 
The right to a healthy environment  was first explicitly recognised as a non-binding 
principle in the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations on the Human Environment 
(the  Stockholm  Declaration)  and  the  1992  Rio  Declaration  on  Environment  and 
Development (the Rio Declaration). Those Declarations were not intended to create 
legal  rights  and  obligations.  However,  they  did  contribute  to  the  development  of 
international  and  national  law.  The  Stockholm  Conference  is  considered  an 
important  starting  point  in  developing  environmental  law  at  the  global  as  well  as 
national  level.  Principle  1  of  the  Stockholm  Declaration  linked  environmental 
protection to human rights norms, stating: 
 
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he 
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present 
and future generations. 
 
Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration established a further foundation for linking 
human rights and environmental protection, declaring that Man has the fundamental 
right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a 
                                                 
68   The employer's duty of care in  South  Africa is the  only mechanism whereby  employers  who 
breach the duty of care owed to their employees can be held accountable through a system of 
administrative sanctions regulated by the inspectorate and the criminal justice system. The civil 
justice system has no role to play. Indeed, it is expressly excluded. 
69   Section 24 Constitution. S 24(a) affords everyone the right to an environment that is not harmful 
to their health or well-being. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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quality  that  permits  a  life  of  dignity  and  well-being.  In  resolution  45/94  the  UN 
General Assembly recalled the language of Stockholm, stating that all individuals are 
entitled  to  live  in  an  environment  adequate  for  their  health  and  well-being.  The 
resolution called for enhanced efforts to ensure a better and healthier environment. 
 
The interpretation of the above legal instruments clearly indicates a paradigm shift in 
the system of occupational health and safety in South Africa. The first one relates to 
the linkage between labour law and human rights. The second one indicates that the 
system  of  occupational  health  and  safety  cannot  operate  in  isolation  thereby 
disregarding other fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution. 
 
In fact, in other jurisdictions, the increased awareness of the constitutional right to a 
healthy environment has led courts to interpret the right to life as implying the right to 
a healthy environment in which to live that life. Authority illustrating this is found in 
the  case  of  Taskin  and  Others  v  Turkey.
70  This  case involved challenges to the 
development and operation of  a  gold mine which the Applicant allege d caused 
environmental damage to the detriment of the people in the region. 
 
In  deciding  this  case,  the  Turkish  Supreme  Administrative  Court  held  that  the 
member states must ensure appropriate protection of life, health, fa mily, private 
property, and the human right to  a healthy, viable and decent environment. In the 
second case of  Tatar v Romania,
71 which arose in the aftermath of an ecological 
disaster at a gold mine in Romania which resulted in high levels of sodium cyanide 
and heavy metals being released into fresh waters, the water caused pollution and 
local residents were affected. The court in its decision held that the government must 
take action to adopt reasonable and adequate measures capable of respecting the 
rights of individuals against serious risks to their health and well-being. 
 
The implementation of occupational health and safety standards in the workplace 
has been a subject of debate at an international  level. To begin with, South Africa 
has ratified two key conventions relating to safety and health: the Safety and Health 
                                                 
70   Taskin v Turkey App. No. 46117/99 2004 Eur Ct Hum Rts 621. 
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in  Mines  Convention
72 and  the  Occupational Safety and  Health  Convention.
73The 
main objective of these  conventions is to improve occupational safety and health 
conditions.
74 
 
The implementation of occupational health and safety  laws in South Africa  leaves 
much  to  be  desired.  This  is  evident  from  the  statistics  of  workers  who  die  in 
accidents underground, while thousands more die of work-related diseases such as 
silicosis.
75 Ladou
76 argues that corporation-dominated institutions will not implement 
meaningful worker-health protection. He therefore proposes a number of strategies 
to  ensure  that  large  corporations  comply  with  occupational  health  and  safety 
legislation.  The  author  indicates  that  i nstitutions  such  as  the  World  Trade 
Organisation, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund can play a key role 
in the implementation of the International Labour Orgnisation Conventions relating to 
occupational safety. One of the strategies that Ladou  proposes is that the WTO, 
World Bank, and IMF can require member states to provide a minimum standard of 
workers' compensation insurance for all workers. 
 
In short, multinational corporations, in particular in the area of mining , have a legal 
duty  to  comply  with the  Constitution  and  specifically  with  the  provisions  covering 
labour  rights,  environmental  protection,  and  occupational  health  and  safety  as 
discussed  above.  Meeran
77  argues that  a duty should be imposed in respect of 
corporations  operating in foreign countries to ensure that th eir  operations do not 
violate workers rights to a safe environment. 
 
Similarly,  numerous  methods  of  imposing  human  rights '  accountability  on 
corporations would be welcome. Such accountability should include the responsibility 
of the state for the actions of those within their jurisdictions. This means that in cases 
involving the violation of occupational health and safety laws, such a state could be 
held liable in international law for human rights '  violations  perpetrated by private 
                                                 
72   Convention on the Safety and Health in Mines 176 of 1995. 
73   Convention on Occupational Safety and Health 155 of 1981. 
74   Wilson 2007 Journal of Occupational Health 72-79. 
75   SIMRAC 2003 researchspace.csir.co.za 24. 
76   Ladou 2005 IJOEH 210-211. 
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entities, including corporations.
78 Finally, the proposals for the inclusion of a human 
rights'  (social clause) exception to free trade provisions under the WTO regime 
would improve compliance with occupational health and safety legislation. 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
 
In the Mankayi case, the Constitutional Court was called upon to give meaning and 
content by interpreting the provision whereby employees qualify for compensation for 
occupational  injuries  or  diseases,  either  in  terms  of  COIDA  or  ODIMWA,  to 
determine whether or not their common-law right of recourse against their employers 
in cases where they sustain occupational injuries or contract occupational diseases 
is extinguished by virtue of section 35(1) of COIDA. 
 
The  Court  noted  that  compensation  under  ODIMWA  is  far  less  generous  and 
comprehensive than that afforded under COIDA and concluded that the exclusion of 
common-law  liability  in  section  35(1)  is  limited  to  those  employees  entitled  to 
compensation under COIDA. According to the Court, to hold otherwise would strain 
the  plain  meaning  of  the  language  in  section  35(1).  In  its  judgment  the  Court 
unanimously held that mineworkers who have contracted compensatable diseases 
under ODIMWA retain their common-law right to claim against their employers. 
 
The above analysis has endeavoured to show the role that the Constitutional Court 
has played in protecting miners against occupational diseases. For that reason it is 
argued that the Constitutional Court has developed a precedent to determine the 
content and meaning of the employer's duty of care. This means there are yardsticks 
or standards of conduct against which employers' conduct can be measured and 
judged.  This  judgment  will  instil  accountability  in  employers  who  have  exploited 
workers for many years  by expecting them to work under horrendous conditions. 
Secondly,  the  judgment  indicates  that  it  is  time  that  mine  owners  were  held  to 
account for their responsibilities for the health and safety of their employees in the 
workplace. 
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In addition, in most civil-law jurisdictions the common-law duty of care is constantly 
being refined and given meaning and content by the courts through their judgments 
(as  discussed  above).
79  In most countries the legislature has further refined the 
employer's duty of care by enacting health and safety legislation. In gen eral, health 
and safety legislation is intended to give specific content to the duty of care and to 
enhance  accountability  by  providing  for  a  range  of  additional  crimina l  and 
administrative sanctions. 
 
The judgment has attracted various criticisms. The critics of the Court charge it with 
"opening the flood gates" to cases against employers. However, there is a threefold 
answer to these  critics. Firstly, this judgment, it is submitted, is groundbreaking in 
that  it has paved the way for mineworkers to seek ju stice outside of the failed 
compensation system. Secondly, the decision of the Constitutional Court provides us 
with an opportunity to fight the legacy of asbestos and silicosis that has left a trail of 
health  and  death   threats  in  our  communities.  Thirdly,  the  Mankayi  case  also 
highlights the lopsided nature of the workers' compensation laws in South Africa, 
which  lean  towards  compensation  and  place  little  focus  on  human  rights.  On  a 
positive note, the Mankayi judgment places a duty on the employer to implement 
numerous good practice solutions which will enhance safety in the workplace. 
 
In  conclusion,  the  Mankayi  case  illustrates  an  inherent  gap  in  the  system  of 
occupational  health  and  safety  in  South  Africa.  The  Committee  of  Inquiry  into  a 
National  Health  and  Safety  Council  concluded  that  the  system  of  compensation 
under COIDA and ODIMWA has not maximised its potential to promote preventative 
activities.
80 Even though it is more cost effective to run an effective rehabilitation 
scheme than to pay long-term cash benefits to victims of occupational accidents or 
diseases, reintegration measures are not being sufficiently addressed by the relevant 
South African legislation.
81 It is evident that there is a need for a unified system 
                                                 
79   The employer's duty of care in  South  Africa is the  only mechanism whereby  employers  who 
breach  the  duty  of  care  owed  to  their  employees  can  be  held  accountable.  In  practice  it  is 
through  a  system  of  administrative  sanctions,  regulated  by  the  inspectorate  and  the  criminal 
justice system, that the employer can be held accountable for non-compliance with his common 
law duties. The civil justice system has no role to play. Indeed, it is expressly excluded. 
80   Olivier Social Security 491-499. 
81   COIDA requires that the employer must pay the compensation due to the injured employee for 
the first three months of temporary total disablement (s 47(3)). This could perhaps be seen as a 
measure  which  will  ensure  to  some  extent  the  continuation  of  the  employee's  link  with  his CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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which will address issues of occupational health and safety in a coordinated and 
unified manner. 
                                                                                                                                                        
employment. However, this remains essentially a temporary measure which is not backed by 
other (re)integration measures. CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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